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1. Summary  
A number of Eastern European countries have implemented tax and privatisation policies that 
have led to robust growth and improved economic governance1. There is much less evidence of 
countries effectively dismantling or weakening existing, entrenched oligarchic structures as part 
of this process. Oligarchy is understood here as a system of governance in which a small, 
informal, economically powerful group dominates political decision-making. Business-state 
relations in oligarchic societies are characterised by personalisation, secrecy, and frequent 
illegality. 
The experiences of Georgia, Poland, and Estonia stand out as countries that have either 
instituted a relatively healthy business-state relationship (Poland and Estonia) or that have 
managed to curb corruption and foster a competitive capitalist economy (Georgia). This report 
draws mainly on the experience of Georgia and Poland2. It identifies privatisation and tax reforms 
that have produced economic outcomes that can reasonably be judged to enhance growth and 
(to a significantly lesser extent) weaken entrenched state-business networks. However, these 
reforms have almost always been part of a larger program of economic and political 
restructuring, making it difficult to establish whether specific policies led to the desired outcome 
or if they interacted with a range of other processes in doing so.  
Very limited tax reform literature was found to be of relevance to the scope of this rapid review. 
Anti-money laundering and BEPS-related searches did not turn up many studies of the actual 
impact of incorporating these frameworks into law and there does not seem to be much evidence 
of countries successfully reducing the Corporate Income Tax (CIT) gap3. Taxation is therefore a 
secondary focus in this report.  
Key findings are as follows: 
 New, legitimate, and united political leadership is key to the success of radical 
reforms and breaking established state-business nexuses. Piecemeal reforms and 
continuity of state personnel are unlikely to yield positive results. For countries where a 
sharp break is not possible, the outcomes of incremental reform are likely to be eroded 
as entrenched interests shift and adapt to changing conditions. 
 Listing large private and public companies on the stock exchange – domestic and foreign 
– has improved corporate governance in Georgia.   
 Privatisation must be transparent and selling large state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) in a 
murky business environment needs to involve established foreign intermediaries.  
                                                   
1 The views presented in this report are gathered from the available literature and do not reflect the views of the 
author. 
2 The Estonian case was judged to be even more ‘exceptional’ than these two because of its Nordic connections 
and an even smaller population than Georgia. However, the structure of the oligarchy in Georgia (population 
about 3 million) is much less complex than in Ukraine. In the former, one very powerful man dominates politics 
whereas Ukraine could be said to manifest oligarchic pluralism, where competing clans and groups vie for 
dominance in a much larger economy. The Russian and Ukrainian political-economic landscapes are more 
similar, but Russia has yet to have much success in combating its oligarchy.   
3 An international taxation expert contacted for this report explained that the literature on impact is still sparse 
given the secrecy, complexity, and contested legality of the issues involved.  
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 Privatisation to foreign owners is linked to better performance.  
 Mass privatisation –  privatisation to a large number of shareholders as opposed to a 
negotiated sale to a single buyer – produced effective corporate governance structures 
in Poland.  
 Labour councils – if strong enough and imbued with the right spirit as in Poland in the 
1990’s – can contribute to good corporate governance and asset preservation in large 
public enterprises. 
 Where privatisation is not possible or desirable, imposing hard budget constraints on 
SOE’s in Estonia and Georgia has been transformative.  
 Digitising records, particularly using blockchain technology where appropriate, has 
reduced opportunities for corruption and secretive transactions.  
 Separating land administration from land management and centralizing the 
administration of land into a single, unified central government institution, with no 
influence from local governments has reduced the scope for corruption and manipulation 
in Georgia’s land market. 
 Land ceilings and other restrictions on land ownership have contributed to a more 
dispersed structure of land ownership in Georgia. 
 Reforming the tax administration, specifically making it less coercive and target-driven 
and more client-oriented, has been key to Poland’s tax reform success. Reducing the 
scope for bureaucratic discretion has also been important (accomplished in part through 
digitisation). 
 No Eastern European country stands out as having made significant progress on 
corporate tax evasion. However VAT collection in Poland has improved via the 
introduction of the split payment mechanism and OECD-defined Standard Audit File-Tax 
(SAF-T) reporting system. VAT collection has also improved in Georgia (although the 
rapid nature of this review did not permit inquiry into why and how). 
2. Privatisation – An overview of methods  
Literature on privatisation in Eastern Europe dates mostly from the 1990’s and 2000’s; much less 
has been published in recent years and privatisation appears to be of much less academic and 
policy interest over the last decade. We therefore draw mainly on retrospective analyses by 
scholars and practitioners with an eye to explaining why specific privatisation initiatives may have 
led to improved economic performance. As Estrin et.al.(2009: 724) observe in conclusion to a 
widely-cited paper on effects of privatisation and ownership in transition economies, ‘privatisation 
per se does not guarantee improved performance, at least not in the short to medium run. Type 
of private ownership, corporate governance, access to know-how and markets, and the legal and 
institutional system matter for firm restructuring and performance’.  
Estrin and Pelletier (2018:97) synthesize a broad range of literature on privatisation methods and 
their impacts. The main methods of privatisation, listed in order of likely favourable impact on 
economic growth, are as follows: 
• Sale to high-quality foreign firms  
• Sale on domestic capital market via Initial Public Offerings (IPO’s) 
• Sale to domestic businesses or business groups  
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• Sale to existing managers and/or workers 
• Free distribution of shares to the population (mass privatisation)  
All of these methods have been trialled in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European states, 
with widely varying success and obvious trade-offs. The literature on this region is in agreement 
on the fact that the structure of ownership of privatised firms is a strong determinant of 
economic performance – insider vs outsider, dispersed vs concentrated, and domestic vs 
foreign ownership significantly impact firm operation. In their study of transition economies, Estrin 
et. al. (2009) find that foreign ownership is strongly associated with increases in productive 
efficiency, whereas majority domestic is also overall positive but much weaker. They also find 
support for the hypothesis that concentrated ownership tends to increase productive efficiency 
more than dispersed ownership. That concentrated ownership – as produced by case-by-case 
sales and not mass distribution to a population – produces better economic management is a 
common observation in the literature (eg: Kopf and Desai 2008), but ‘it may be that countries with 
good policy frameworks attract core investors while poor policy countries do not; and it is the 
policy environment as much as, if not more than, the degree of ownership concentration that 
accounts for the progress seen’ (Nellis 2002:26). 
Reviewing East European privatisation experiences from 1990 to 2008, Goldberg and Nellis 
(2008) – both formerly senior officials at the World Bank with direct experience in Eastern Europe 
– advance a set of recommendations for countries that have not yet transitioned fully and 
continue to hold large public assets (ibid: 367-8). 
1. For large companies, use competitive tenders, not private trade sales. Use international 
financial advisers and select them competitively. 
2. For SME’s, use winner-take-all auctions which offer the majority of shares to 
concentrated investors having both the incentive and authority to establish good 
corporate governance. 
3. For companies that do not initially sell in auctions or tenders, explore the following: more 
flexible pricing and repeated auctions or tenders, restructuring followed by repeated 
offering for sale, and finally, when all else fails, bankruptcy.  
4. For large loss-making SOE’s, restructuring needs to take place before privatisation as 
opposed to the ‘business as usual’ approach of Ukraine. 
5. The critical importance of transparency remains the single most important lesson. 
6. Building the capacity of the privatisation agency early on in the process is critical. Even 
the best financial advisers have not prevented scandals, particularly in low-income 
countries where the capacity of the privatisation agency is weak  
The problem of how to ensure transparency and a competitive bidding process in the context of 
the bureaucratic-oligarchic nexus is unfortunately not considered by the authors.  
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3. Poland  
Country Overview 
Poland’s economic ascent is remarkable. With a growth rate of about 4% a year since 1990, the 
country moved to middle income status just 15 years after the end of communism and is now 
considered high income (WB 2017). Growth has been relatively broad-based – unlike many other 
former transition economies, the Gini coefficient has not increased and Poland has no oligarchy. 
Never part of the Soviet Union, Poland was the first to embark upon the sweeping privatisations 
that transformed Eastern Europe. Although neither the Polish state nor business is immune from 
rent-seeking, privatisation here did not lead to politically connected elites amassing huge 
fortunes as happened in Russia and Ukraine. The literature reviewed for this report reveals the 
following factors contributing to successful privatisation: 
Lessons from Poland’s privatisation 
Working with strong labour councils led to asset preservation and improved corporate 
governance. This is counterintuitive to the liberal orthodoxy, but in hindsight labour unions are 
thought to have contributed significantly to the success of Poland’s privatisation program4. 
Advisors and Polish reformers were deeply frustrated by union power in the early 1990’s, 
assuming it would impede and distort the privatisation process while unaccountable managers 
would strip assets and hollow out companies. However, in hindsight scholars and practitioners 
(including World Bank advisers closely involved in the Polish privatisation programme in the 
1990’s) observe that labour councils actually kept an eye on managers, checking if not totally 
preventing them from asset-stripping during the slow process of privatisation (Nellis 2002, Appel 
2004, Baltowski and Mickiewicz 2000).  
The World Bank had advised Polish authorities to consolidate control over enterprises and 
disempower the unions. However, the Poles rejected this suggestion, evincing a very deep 
mistrust of bureaucrats and accepting labour unions as the lesser evil. Legislation was passed in 
1990 stipulating that enterprises could only be sold with the approval of insiders (managers and 
workers councils). While this slowed the process down significantly, the oversight provided by 
worker organisations prevented the disastrous hollowing out of companies witnessed in 
Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and many other Eastern European countries where managers 
assumed control and stripped significant value from the enterprises (Appel 2004; Nellis 2002). 
Workers also carried and communicated important know-how of operations into new 
management structures. For countries still looking to divest public assets and democratise asset 
ownership, bolstering worker participation in the process may be worth considering.   
 
Mass privatisation, but with concentrated ownership and control, could be a politically 
and economically beneficial strategy. Like in other post-communist states, Polish Mass 
Privatisation (MPP) was a politically palatable and economically viable measure. But while 
                                                   
4 Poland’s Solidarity union was one of the biggest labour unions in the world and a key actor in the country’s 
political transformation. 
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elsewhere mass privatisation led to diffused ownership and control and resulted in poor 
corporate governance, in Poland it was directed towards concentrated ownership and control. 
Shares distributed to Polish citizens were converted to shares in one of 15 or so National 
Investment Funds (NIFs) that had part-ownership of a pool of privatised firms. Each NIF initially 
had 33% equity in 30 state enterprises, Polish workers had 15%, and the state retained 25%. 
Once MPP was complete, the NIF’s were floated on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 1997. The 
state’s role in these funds declined rapidly while the role of large investors – particularly foreign – 
increased just as rapidly, and the average share of the 3 largest shareholders went from 7% in 
1998 to 42% in 2000 (Kopf et al. 2008; Baltowski and Mickiewicz 2000). There was however 
political pressure on the funds, particularly with regard to maintaining certain enterprises and not 
decreasing employment, which detracted from the benefits that could potentially have been 
realised from concentrated ownership. The effects of rolling out MPP in this way deepened 
capital markets and involved Polish citizens while placing limits on their involvement.  
 
Listing SOE’s on the stock exchange improved corporate governance. The number of 
SOE’s fell from 8,500 in 1989 to around 700 in 2018. 500 of these are now listed on the Warsaw 
stock exchange, with a domestic market capitalisation of about $150 billion (in 2015). Corporate 
governance has improved dramatically and SOE’s contribute significantly to the Polish budget 
rather than requiring subsidies (WB 2017: 54). Loss-making SOE’s were (are?) taxed heavily if 
they exceed spending targets (ibid:17) and bankruptcy is established practise as banks – 
privatised and state-owned - operate on a policy of ‘no bailouts’ that make banks accountable for 
bad debts (ibid: 19).  
 
Rapid privatisation of small enterprises encouraged the development of new SME’s. Small 
enterprises were the first ones to be sold in Poland; by the end of 1992, 82% (194,000) had been 
sold and were judged to be a great success (Nellis 2002:8). The process was uncontroversial, 
the quality and quantity of services improved greatly, and many new jobs were created5. More 
importantly however, the sale of small firms combined with the introduction of free entry for new 
businesses, tight fiscal, monetary and wage policies that served to stabilise the economy, and 
near-total price liberalisation contributed to creating an enabling environment for new 
businesses. The rapid privatisation of small enterprises served as an invitation to new capital, 
and these new firms have been the engine of growth in Poland, often outperforming their 
restructured counterparts (ibid:16).  
 
The slow pace of the process may not have been a problem (late privatisers take heart!). 
Larger units – of which Poland had 8,500 or 3,177 depending on who was counting – were much 
more difficult to sell than smaller ones. Yet speed was considered essential. The IFI’s, Western 
economists, and Polish ideologues and policymakers keen for capitalism were driven by a very 
strong political – not economic – motive in this regard, namely ‘the fear that delaying the change 
of ownership would allow for the return of the communists’ (ibid: 9). Despite this, by Eastern 
                                                   
5 The privatisation of small enterprises has generally been easy and has yielded similar results across the 
transition economies. 
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European standards Poland turned out to be a very slow privatiser but this was obviously not a 
problem because Poland returned to growth more rapidly and with more vigour than most other 
transition economies.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, Polish privatisation was embedded in a larger, effective program of 
economic reform: ‘evolutionary and cautious large-scale privatisation worked in Poland because 
it was enmeshed in a setting of sound and well-applied economic and financial policies, vibrant 
new entry, robust political competition, and the rudiments of corporate governance in remaining 
SOE’s provided (certainly) by the workers councils on the one hand and (perhaps) by the 
professional and private National Investment Fund managers on the other’ (Nellis 2002: 18).  
 
A brief note from Estonia 
In a relatively rare counter to the increasingly-common institutionalist view which holds that good 
institutions are necessary for good governance, Abrams and Fish (2015) argue that policies can 
produce positive outcomes without being embedded in good institutions.  
Drawing on the example of Estonia – which has experienced rapid and steady growth and has no 
oligarchy – they argue that well-designed rules can lay the foundations for good institutions. They 
then go a step further and conclude that a single policy – that of hard budget constraints 
(HBC’s) on SOE’s – is key. Privatisation is unnecessary they argue; it is more viable to harden 
Box 2: Privatising Ukrainian SOE’s away from the oligarchy  
Given the extent of resource mismanagement by the Ukrainian state, many recommend 
privatising as many SOE’s as possible, including the largest firms in the energy and 
infrastructure sectors (Cohen 2015). Privatisation must be transparent, for which digital 
technologies and procurement platforms such as ProZorro (the Ukrainian word for 
transparency) are very useful. In 2017, ProZorro completed 870,060 online auctions with an 
estimated value of $11.4 billion. According to a survey from the same year, perceptions of 
corruption by business owners had dropped by almost 50% since the system began 
operating. There is however pressure to restrict foreign bidders on ProZorro and for the 
platform to adopt a ‘Ukraine first’ policy which will negate much of the positive effect that it 
has had to date (Manthrope, 2018).  
The largest state enterprises are more complex, and a simple e-auction through ProZorro or 
similar platforms will not suffice. According to Cohen (2015) and in line with 
recommendations from numerous other sources, privatising these needs to involve two 
distinct steps. First, the government should select international investment banks to 
function as lead managers for each of these large enterprises. These banks need to 
prepare financial statements and bidding rules for each state enterprise, marketing it both 
domestically and internationally, and selecting the winning bidder. Second, a committee of 
experts from Ukraine’s leading civil society organizations, such as Transparency International 
Ukraine, must certify that the sales process was free of corruption. No final contract 
should be signed until this occurs.  
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budgets, make the public sector fully competitive, and break the culture of ‘political capitalism’ in 
transition economies. The increased viability of HBC’s for them stems from the fact that they can 
be imposed by a handful of committed reformers in control of a few key ministries. The authors 
acknowledge that this will be more difficult in countries where the links between state and 
business elites are well established but maintain that HBC’s ‘stand a better chance than do the 
institutionalist’s dreams of transplanting Scandinavian-quality institutions into the likes of Russia 
and Ukraine’ (2015: 20)6. 
Taxation in Poland 
In matters of taxation, Poland compares favourably to most Eastern European countries. A 
number of scholars believe that the success of the taxation regime depends less on specific tax 
policies and more on the state-society relationship: ‘The true test for countries taking a fresh-start 
approach towards altering state-society relations lies in whether the state institutions, agencies, 
and bureaucracies – the real heart and guts of the state apparatuses that sit below the elites and 
interact with citizens at street level – can be reformed and made less corrupt. This was critical for 
Poland in 1989 and it is vital for Ukraine today’ (Berenson 2018: 2). 
Berenson’s (2018) comparative study of tax morale examines Poland, Ukraine, and Russia, and 
finds Poland’s tax regime to be ‘compliance-oriented’ while Russia and Ukraine are 
‘coercive’ (Ukraine being more weakly coercive than Russia). Russia and Ukraine’s tax 
bureaucracies seek power as an end in itself or ‘over’ society but the Polish bureaucracy has 
built a state-society relationship characterised by significantly more trust and reciprocity. Unlike in 
the two former Soviet states, efforts to reform the tax administration in Poland have focused on 
institutional design and reducing the ability of bureaucrats to exercise undue discretion. Further, 
the taxation system is less target-driven and treats taxpayers like clients rather than revenue 
sources to be mined7. 
In recent years, Poland has been simplifying its tax regime and attempting to bring more of the 
economy into the tax net. According to the publicly funded Polish Economic Institute, some of 
these reforms have met with great success. Value Added Tax (VAT) collection has improved 
significantly in recent years and the gap between expected and collected Corporate Income 
Tax (CIT) has fallen. The VAT gap narrowed by 13% points between 2013-2017 (PEI 2020) and 
the CIT gap by more than 50%.  
Closing the CIT gap 
The 57% decrease in the CIT gap since 2015 – reported in Polish newspapers and of great 
interest to this review because of the potential policy lessons that could be derived – appears 
unfortunately to be mostly attributable to a recalculation based on a new methodology by the 
Polish Economic Institute. Poland lost between 11 billion and 21.4 billion zloty in 2017, i.e. an 
amount is equal to 0.55 - 1.08 percent of GDP in unpaid CIT. According to the Institute (PEI 
                                                   
6 For the authors’ recommendations regarding weakening the oligarchy in Ukraine, see Abrams and Fish, 2017, 
‘Four Steps to Ukraine’s Freedom, Or A Plan For Taming Ukraine’s Oligarchs. https://voxukraine.org/en/four-
steps-to-ukraine-s-freedom-en/ 
7 In 2016, Ukrainian inspectors were still supposedly receiving bonuses based on the fines they collected, 
incentivizing coercive measures. Further, a target-based approach provides incentives to continue targeting 
known taxpayers rather than those not currently in the tax net (Berenson 2018) 
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2019), the Polish government introduced a long list of reforms aimed at enforcing CIT such as 
introducing a minimum tax on commercial real estate, changes to the rules of foreign-controlled 
companies and changes in the taxation of joint-stock limited partnerships. ‘The changes 
presented above have a major impact on the size of the CIT gap and are reducing it gradually’ 
says the report (2019:33). However, the bulk of the reduction appears to have come from the 
recalculation. 
Closing the VAT gap 
VAT collection however has been more successful. Poland has made substantial improvements 
on this front in recent years, narrowing the VAT gap from 24% in 2015 to 7-12% of potential 
revenue in 2018. Success has come from a coordinated effort to adopt new legislation, reform 
and digitise tax administration, and improve business-state relations (PEI 2020, 2019). VAT is 
the state’s biggest source of revenue and accounts for around 40% of the country’s budget. After 
the 2008 crisis, the gap between expected and collected VAT revenue started growing, 
prompting Poland to enact the following measures: 
 One of the most effective ‘targeted’ measures was the introduction of a split payment 
system in 2018, where a buyer can choose to pay VAT directly to a supplier’s dedicated 
VAT bank account and the supplier only has limited access to the money in this account. 
The incentive of this scheme for the supplier is that VAT refunds are processed in just 25 
days (rather than 60) while buyers avoid implication in the supplier’s tax debts.  
 
 Poland adopted the OECD-defined Standard Audit File-Tax (SAF-T) reporting system in 
2016. Every month, companies send a report to the tax register via a new IT system and 
a new central register of invoices is being established to consolidate data and help tax 
authorities follow up with taxpayers.  
 
 The National Revenue Administration was established by consolidating the tax 
administration system, the Customs Service and the fiscal control system, previously 
operating separately. This has contributed to better detection of VAT fraud and less effort 
expended on checks. 
 
 Cooperation between the consolidated tax authorities and the IT and banking sectors 
was improved and new automated analytical tools were developed that made it possible 
to spot fictitious turnover and suspicious bank transactions (PEI 2019) 
Improving tax morale 
Tax morale – or the willingness of taxpayers to pay tax – may also have increased in Poland. 
This can be inferred from the fact that the ‘shadow’ economy8 decreased from 15.7% of GDP in 
2015 to 13.7% in 2018 and total tax revenues increased with no increase in tax levels (PEI 
2019).  
                                                   
8 The PEI defines the shadow economy as unregistered and undeclared economic activity that is not based on 
the trade of drugs, arms, and trafficking.   
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Tax morale in Poland has been relatively high in comparison to other countries, attributable 
perhaps to starting off on the right foot. In the early 1990’s the state adopted a truly unique policy 
of sending street-level bureaucrats out into the public ‘to educate people on what these newly 
founded things called taxes actually were’ (Berenson 2018: 267). Polish tax men went on TV, 
radio, in towns and villages, and opened special tax assistance booths in tax offices around the 
country in order to explain what the new tax system was all about. This was so effective that by 
the end of the 1990’s, ‘the Poles rated the tax administration – yes, the tax administration! – 
as the most favoured state agency due to this type of outreach’ (ibid: 267). One of the Ukraine 
Tax Administration’s (STA) more successful civic activities has been drawing competitions for 
elementary schoolchildren and the STA has certainly become more communicative over time, yet 
Berenson thinks outreach can extend well beyond current measures.  
A key lesson from Poland’s experience in this area is that reforming the tax administration is 
essential. Increasing the number of employees, budgets, changing incentives for employees, and 
strengthening systemic risk assessment can yield good results (Berenson 2018, World Bank 
2017, PEI 2019).  
 
4. Georgia  
Georgia Country Overview 
Georgia’s economic transformation has been incredibly rapid and is considered highly successful 
by IFI’s and many liberal analysts. Reforms are correlated (if not always linked causally) with 
robust GDP growth and the economy has grown at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent over 
the last decade (WB 2020). FDI has averaged more than $1.3 billion every year between 2006 
and 2018 (Geostat 2019), petty corruption has decreased markedly, and Georgia is currently 7th 
in the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ rankings.  
Although the Georgian economy is home to a number of oligarchs who have used – and continue 
to use – their connections with the state as a means of enrichment, it has simultaneously found a 
path to growth and improved economic governance9. The country made a slow start in the 
1990’s, but with the election of the Saakashvili government in 2003 Georgia’s new, young, and 
ideologically committed leaders embarked on a radical program of transformation that included 
privatisation, almost full deregulation, cutting or abolishing 20 taxes, massive downsizing of the 
public sector, and trade liberalisation10.  
Privatisation began in the 1990’s with people acquiring property rights of their homes and 
agricultural lands for nominal prices, while large-scale enterprise privatisation started in earnest 
in 2004. By 2010 the government had divested itself of 3,966 assets worth 1.4 billion USD 
                                                   
9 See Kononczuk et. al. (2017) for a review of the role of oligarchs in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, including 
portfolio of assets, nature of their political influence, and effects on governance for each country.   
10 Estonia took a similar path and is also an Eastern European ‘super reformer’ along with Georgia. However, the 
time constraints on this report prevent us from considering the Estonian experience.  
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(Gugushvili 2017: 3) and the number of enterprises of interest to the private sector had dwindled 
significantly. In June 2019 the National Agency of State Property only had 97 SOE’s remaining, 
down from 490 enterprises in 2012 when the agency was established (Georgia Today 2019).  
There are many elements to this success story and of course, plenty of qualifiers. Income 
inequality is the highest of any transition economy and the oligarchisation of the economy 
continues (Kupatadze 2018). However, the literature identifies a few important measures that 
have helped create a more open and competitive business environment. This report reviews 
some of them briefly before reviewing the experience of privatisation (in particular, land 
privatisation) in Georgia. This rapid review could not find any literature on privatisation or land 
reform in Georgia in the context of oligarchic control – hence the information presented has been 
selected on what we think could be relevant to a reform program seeking to ‘deoligarchify’ the 
economy.  
Improving economic performance in Georgia 
A young, energized, and coherent group of new elites took power in 2004 and radically 
downsized the corrupt and inefficient public sector. This was a first major step taken by the 
Saakashvili government. The number of ministries was reduced from 28 to 12, 18 government 
departments were abolished or merged into others. 15,000 traffic police personnel were 
dismissed in a single day and replaced by 2300 newly trained patrol officers. The entire staff of 
the public registry, 2200 people, were also dismissed in a single day. In 2010, the number of 
public officials was 50% less than in 2003, while public sector salaries had been considerably 
increased to reduce the risk of bribery (Gugushvili 2017:3). The new staff of the national public 
registry for example were hired at 20 times the salary of their predecessors (Kupatadaze 2018: 
8). 
Corruption remains however. While the literature is in agreement that petty corruption has 
decreased markedly and citizens evince much greater trust of public institutions, some note that 
elite corruption has not decreased (Kupatadaze 2018, Papava 2013). In the aftermath of the 
Rose Revolution and Saakashvili’s assumption of power, ‘voluntary contributions’ were exacted 
from business owners by the state. This mode of corruption did not have as developmentally 
deleterious effects as others because proceeds went to an impoverished state rather than private 
pockets and helped pay salaries and fund large infrastructure projects etc. (ibid: 10). More 
problematic was the state-business nexus which saw public contracts being awarded to major 
financial contributors of the ruling party and a new oligarchic elite emerged to replace the old 
(Kupatadze 2018). This practice – along with increasing nepotism and secretive procurement by 
state departments – continues under the Georgian Dream government, but state extortion is 
reported to have decreased substantially (arguably because the Georgian Dream leader Bidzina 
Ivanishvili is the richest man in Georgia). 
 
Crucially, privatisation took place through open, transparent auctions. The first property 
sold under the privatisation plan may well have set the tone for subsequent sales. Intourist Hotel 
was located in the Black Sea resort town of Batumi, and was expected to sell for about USD 3 
million at open auction. However, the first interested buyer was a politically well-connected 
businessman who approached through his contacts with an offer of about USD 80,000. When 
rejected, he increased this to USD 200,000 but the maverick figure of Kakha Bendukidze, at the 
time Minister for the Coordination of Economic Reforms, had decided that open auctions were to 
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be the way. A presentation was prepared for international companies and commercial banks, the 
hotel building was decorated with a large red ribbon, and when Prime Minister Saakashvili asked 
Bendukidze to tea with his ‘friend’, Bendukidze reiterated his commitment to open auction. The 
hotel was put up with a reserve price of USD 3 million and sold for USD 3.02 million to a Siberian 
businessman – identified by Bendukidze’s agent – with fond memories of the location from his 
youth (Burakova and Lawson 2014: 31-32). 
 
Georgia listed large SOE’s on the stock exchange. For strategic reasons, Georgia’s 
government decided to retain ownership of the Georgian Railways (GR) and the Georgian Oil 
and Gas Corporation (GOGC). According to the former Georgian Prime Minister, rapid 
improvements in efficiency and economic performance were brought about by these companies 
issuing corporate Eurobonds on the London Stock Exchange and monitoring the difference 
between these and sovereign Eurobonds (issued by the Georgian government). Management 
bonuses were pegged to the difference: ‘In effect, we had the world’s financial markets assess 
the performance of the respective management teams for us’ (Gilauri 2017:121). A further 
unintended beneficial effect was that managers started to act as ‘salespersons of the country 
itself’ (ibid) because they were incentivised to liase with foreign investors and provide assurances 
that investments were low-risk and worth making. Gilauri recounts that in 2015 he met the 
Ukrainian minister of economy in Kiev and offered him ‘an out-of-box solution that may have 
changed the country and create[d] a stepping stone for the turnaround path of Ukrainian 
economy’ (122). The solution was that Ukrainian oligarchs be required by law to float IPOs 
on international financial markets. Gilauri thought oligarchs would comply if they knew that all 
were required to do this and no one was being singled out. Public listing would force them to 
restructure, hire new managers, and quickly link their wealth to the health of the economy as had 
happened in Georgia. 
Box 2: Lessons Learned from Georgia’s Anti-Corruption Reforms (Kupatadze 2018) 
 
 Reforms can succeed only if time is used efficiently after a window of political 
opportunity opens as happened in Georgia. Indeed, most crucial reforms were 
undertaken in the first two to three years after the revolution. Deep-reaching orthodox 
reforms to the public sector may be undertaken through unorthodox means. 
 The civil service can be reformed without commensurate reform of the political 
system; the Georgian experience shows that a rational governance regime 
characterised by an impersonal set of rules can successfully be introduced in the 
public service while the political system continues to operate according to a non-
transparent and patronage-based logic. 
 Successful reform of public institutions in a country like Georgia shows that there is 
no such thing as ‘endemic’ corruption. Georgia was regarded as one of the most 
notoriously corrupt countries not only in the post-Soviet era, but also during Soviet 
times.  
 The Georgian experience also shows that if new functional institutions are 
created, then changes in government do not necessarily reverse them. ‘Islands 
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Privatising land - lessons from Georgia11 
Land reform and privatisation in Georgia is considered one of the most successful reform 
programmes in Eastern Europe (FAO). It took place in two phases – 1992-1998 and 2005-2011. 
Most recently, Georgia has pioneered the use of blockchain technology for property-related 
transactions and thereby further reduced opportunities for secretive transactions, data 
manipulation, and corruption. The literature shows a number of factors may have contributed to 
improved land governance and increasing trust in Georgian land markets.  
Disband inherited communist-era corporate structures (contra Ukraine). Corporate farms in 
Georgia are new organizational entities with an average size of 100 hectares (down from 1300 
hectares in 1990). Soviet farm enterprises were also disbanded in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
whereas in Ukraine, they have been passed down largely unchanged. Disbanding inherited 
corporate structures seems to have played a role in improving land governance and utilisation 
and ‘despite the significant presence of corporate farms, Georgia has lost the sharply dual 
pattern of land distribution which still characterizes Ukraine (small individual farms versus huge 
corporate farms)’ (Lerman 2004: 60).  
Place clear restrictions on ownership. As is the case in Ukraine today, Georgia’s farmers and 
rural populations were afraid that privatising land would lead to their dispossession. Georgian 
authorities accommodated these fears by deciding that certain farmland auctions would only be 
open to residents of neighbouring villages and local residents could themselves decide on the 
size of each lot (but these could not be less than 3 hectares). 35% of total farmland was 
privatised in this way (Burakova and Lawson 2014: 34-35).  
Other accounts corroborate this general picture, noting that land privatisation in Georgia was 
designed to increase production by agricultural households, not bump up largescale, commercial, 
export-oriented farming (Lerman 2004, Spoor 2012). Policies were intended to strengthen 
traditional subsistence agriculture as well as enhance the supply of commercial farm products to 
urban markets during the difficult transition period (Lerman 2004: 59). In those countries where 
‘plot-based’ redistributive land reform took place (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
                                                   
11 We focus on land privatisation because Ukraine is soon to lift the moratorium on land sales and it may be that 
Georgia’s experience could be relevant. 
of integrity’ may persist and expand, especially if they have been performing 
successfully for some time. This likely hinges on continued popular demand and 
support for equitable and efficient access to good quality public services. 
 Young politicians with a strong popular mandate and a coherent shared 
commitment to reform in Georgia and Estonia have managed to implement efficient 
anti-corruption policies. Less coherent elite cohorts in which new entrants mix with 
the old guard (eg: Latvia, Armenia, Ukraine) have been less effective in reform 
endeavors. The success in both cases of Georgia and Estonia is determined mainly 
by domestic agency and not external factors. (Kupatadze 2018: 202) 
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Kyrgyzstan and Moldova), land ownership seems to have had a positive correlation with rural 
income levels (Spoor 2012:190). Such land reform, at least in the short run, contributed positively 
to agricultural growth and reducing rural poverty.  
However, it should be noted that agricultural fragmentation in Georgia is high – the average size 
of a privatised individual holding was 0.25 hectares during the mass privatisation that took place 
in 1992-1998 (WB 2013: 3.2.1). This has resulted in an active lease market, and the often low 
lease prices impact negatively on rural poverty while allowing large farmers to produce at lower 
prices (Spoor 2012). Property rights reform has clearly not been enough to secure the wellbeing 
of the rural population or meaningfully democratise land ownership and control. 
 
Improve land governance systems. Since the mid-2000’s, Georgian reforms have focused on 
separating land administration from land management; centralizing the administration of land into 
a single, unified central government institution, with no influence from local governments; 
delegating a number of functions to the private sector; and designing a self-financing public 
registry. These goals have largely been achieved: a 2013 World Bank investigation found the 
now-self-financing National Public Registry a much more efficient and user-friendly organisation; 
land administration had been broken up into discrete functions and delegated across government 
institutions in a way that minimised opportunities for corruption and political interference; and 
surveying services had been shifted to the private sector to ensure reliability and neutrality (WB 
2013). Endorsement of the reforms can be seen in the fact that between 2016 and February 
2019, 600,000 private owners (totalling 300,000 hectares) officially registered their land through 
the simplified system.  
 
Incorporate digital technologies into land governance. Georgia has pioneered the use of 
blockchain technology in its reformed land registry (NAPR) and significantly increased public 
trust in the land market (Shang and Price 2019). Once NAPR had an accurate record of land 
titles in its database, blockchain technologies became feasible as a means by which to 
significantly increase security and transparency in the titling system. A pilot project was initiated 
in 2016, proved highly successful, and is now being actively furthered in the second, on-going 
phase. As of 2018, a total of 1.5 million land titles were published on the blockchain (ibid: 77). It 
should be noted that blockchain technologies are widespread in Georgia and it is the world’s third 
largest miner of cryptocurrencies. According to the World Bank country report (2018), surveys 
reveal that up to 5% of households in the country are engaged in cryptocurrency mining or 
investments, electricity prices are low, and blockchain ‘literacy’ is much more widespread than in 
many East European countries.    
Box 1: What can Georgia contribute to the debate on lifting Ukraine’s land moratorium?  
The Georgian experience may be instructive for Ukraine as it lifts the moratorium on land 
sales later this year. The expected impacts of lifting the moratorium are highly contested. 
About 70% of territory cannot be bought or sold at the moment. The World Bank is keen to 
‘free’ the market, open it up to domestic and foreign investment and redirect the existing 
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The Georgian experience – an East European ‘best performer’ according to the World Bank – 
indicates that a radical break with the past is necessary and piecemeal reforms and continuity of 
state personnel is unlikely to yield positive results (Kupatadze 2017, 2018). However radical 
change is not always a possibility. In Ukraine for example, political conditions do not allow for 
this, neither is decentralization expected to work because local government is deeply vulnerable 
to cooptation by powerful interests. The Georgian experience also indicates that advice from 
Western advisers is often contrary to what works in practice (the reforming government were 
advised to be less radical, as also happened in Estonia). Kupatadze believes that reforming 
countries should not rely overly on EU support and advice – in Ukraine, he believes that civil 
society may be the force that serves as the necessary vehicle for reform in the country, even 
though ‘positive changes in Ukraine will be slow and piecemeal, which gives more chances to 
entrenched interest to undermine the outcomes of incremental reform’ (Kupatadze, 2017). 
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